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NOTE
The Duty to Control in Negligent Release Cases: King v. Durham County
Mental Health Developmental Disabilities and Substance Abuse
Authority
INTRODUCTION
In King v. Durham County Mental Health Developmental Disabili-
ties and Substance Abuse Authority' (hereafter King), the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals addressed the tort liability of a mental care
provider for acts against third parties in negligent release cases. The
issue in King was whether any of the defendants owed a duty to Sherri
King, the third party victim, who was killed by a patient who escaped
from the facility that was providing the care.2 Without such a duty,
the defendants cannot be liable in tort to the plaintiff.' In general,
such a duty can arise only if a special relationship exists between the
parties.
4
This note will review the specific facts and procedural history of
King and discuss the status of the law in this area. The note will ana-
lyze the reasoning of the two opposing views in this area of the law
and discuss related policy considerations. The note will conclude that
the North Carolina Court of Appeals has unnecessarily placed the
public in danger by refusing to impose liability on an institution that
negligently released a violent patient, despite a statutory scheme
designed to permit the institution to exercise control over voluntarily
committed patients.
THE CASE
Sherri King was shot and killed by Mohammed Thompson and Car-
los Nichols during the robbery of a convenience store in Person
County on February 27, 1990, after Thompson had escaped from a
residential treatment program for minors with emotional handicaps
coupled with violent behavior. Plaintiff Nesbit King, as administrator
of the estate of his deceased wife, Sherri King, appealed from the dis-
missal of his complaint fied in superior court against Durham County
1. 113 N.C. App. 341, 439 S.E.2d 771, cert denied, 336 N.C. 316, 445 S.E.2d 396 (1994).
2. Id. at 345, 439 S.E.2d at 774.
3. See RESrATE ENT (SEcOND) OF TORmS § 315 (1965).
4. Id.
1
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Mental Health Developmental Disaility and Substance Abuse Au-
thority (Durham Mental Health), Lutheran Family Services in the
Carolinas (Lutheran Services), and Durham County Guidance Clinic
for Children and Youth, Inc. (Guidance Clinic).
5
Thompson had a history of drug abuse and violent crime and had
been certified as a Willie M. class member. A Willie M. class member
is a minor "having serious emotional, mental or neurological handi-
caps accompanied by violent or assaultive behavior."6 Defendant
Durham Mental Health was responsible for administration of services
to Willie M. class members in Durham County. Defendant Lutheran
Services was responsible for providing evaluation and treatment of the
residents of Triangle House. Lutheran Services also provided the Tri-
angle House facilities for treatment of Willie M. class members.
These facilities were supposed to be "equipped to prevent residents
from escaping and posing a threat to the community."7 Defendant
Guidance Clinic contracted with Durham Mental Health to provide
psychological testing, evaluation, and treatment of the residents of Tri-
angle House.8
In January of 1990, Thompson was residing at Triangle House and
receiving treatment as a Willie M. class member. Thompson was a
drug abuser, and the possibility of his escape posed a "clear and pres-
ent danger to the general public." 9 In mid-January 1990, Thompson
escaped from Triangle House through a door left unlocked in viola-
tion of the facility's rules. After the escape, neither Lutheran Serv-
ices, Durham Mental Health or Guidance Clinic informed the police
that Thompson had escaped, nor did they seek his return to Triangle
House.' 0
The complaint alleged that the defendants' failure to evaluate
Thompson, failure to provide a secure facility, and the failure to seek
his return after he left Triangle House was gross negligence. The com-
plaint further alleged that it was reasonably foreseeable that Thomp-
son's escape could lead to armed robbery and murder since he had a
history of drug abuse, violence, and other unlawful activity." The de-
fendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.' 2 The Durham County
Superior Court allowed the dismissals, and the North Carolina Court




9. Id. at 343, 439 S.E.2d at 772-73.
10. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 773.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 345, S.E.2d at 774. The motions were converted into a motion for summary judg-
ment under N.C. R. Crv. P. 56 because the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings.
2
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DUTY TO CONTROL
of Appeals affirmed.13 The North Carolina Supreme Court subse-




In general, there is no duty to protect others against harm from
third persons, unless a special relationship exists between the par-
ties.' 5 If a special relationship exists, there arises a duty "upon the
actor to control the third person's conduct,"' 6 and "to guard other
persons against his dangerous propensities.'1 7 Some examples of le-
gally recognized special relationships include: (1).parent-child, 8 (2)
master-servant' 9 (3) landowner-licensee 20 (4) custodian-prisoner 2'
and (5) institution-involuntarily committed mental patient.22 In each
example, "the chief factors justifying imposition of liability are (1) the
ability to control the person, and (2) knowledge of the person's pro-
pensity for violence. '23 The main issue in negligent release cases is
whether the defendant owes a duty to protect the plaintiff from the
acts of a third person.
In Semler v. Psychiatric Inst.,24 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a court order requiring
treatment and confinement of a patient at the Psychiatric Institute im-
13. Id. at 345,439 S.E.2d at 775,777. The trial court also dismissed, pursuant to N.C. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1), the complaints against Durham Mental Health and Lutheran Services, but the appel-
late court did not discuss these alternate dismissals, since its dismissal under N.C. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) was dispositive.
14. King, 336 N.C. 316, 445 S.E.2d 396 (1994).
15. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 383-
85 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 3, § 315.
16. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, supra note 3, § 315(a).
17. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 15, § 56, at 383.
18. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 15, § 56, at 384; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 3, § 316; see also Moore v. Crumpton, 55 N.C. App. 398, 403-04, 285 S.E.2d 842, 845,
modified, 306 N.C. 618, 295 S.E.2d 436 (1982).
19. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 15, § 56, at 384; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 3, § 317; see also Vaughn v. Dep't of Human Resources, 296 N.C. .683, 686, 252 S.E.2d
792, 795 (1979).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 3, § 318.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 3, § 319; Hull v. Oldham, 104 N.C. App.
29, 38, 407 S.E.2d 611, 616, disc. rev. denied, 330 N.C. 441, 412 S.E.2d 72 (1991).
22. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 15, § 56, at 384; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 3, § 319; see Currie v. United States, 836 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1987); Semler v.
Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); Pangbum v. Saad,
73 N.C. App. 336, 347-348, 326 S.E.2d 365, 372-73 (1985).
23. King v. Durham County Mental Health Developmental Disabilities and Substance
Abuse Auth., 113 N.C. App. 341, 348, 439 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1994) (quoting Abernathy v. United
States, 773 F.2d 184, 189 (8th Cir. 1985)).
24. Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).
1995]
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posed a duty on the Institute to the public.25 In Semler, the patient,
Gilreath, was convicted of abducting a young girl, but his sentence was
suspended on the condition that he "receive treatment at and remain
confined in the Psychiatric Institute until released by the Court. ' 26 A
few months after entering the Institute, the doctor recommended and
the judge approved weekend passes for Gilreath. Several months
later, the judge approved Gilreath for status as a day care patient.
The Institute then approved passes, without the consent of the proba-
tion authorities, for Gilreath to go to Ohio to investigate the possibil-
ity of transferring to be closer to his parents. On August 29, 1973,
after three months as a day care patient, Gilreath was discharged from
the Institute on the assumption that he would be accepted for proba-
tion in Ohio. However, the Ohio authorities rejected Gilreath's
transfer. In September, Gilreath again visited the doctor at the Insti-
tute but was not restored to day care status. In October, Gilreath
killed the plaintiff's daughter.27
The court in Semler followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts for-
mulation: "One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows
or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not con-
trolled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third
person to prevent him from doing such harm."'  The court held that
the appropriate standard of care was "delineated by the precise lan-
guage of the court order. '29 The opinion stated that the "appellants
would not be liable had Gilreath escaped despite their exercise of rea-
sonable care....
In Pangburn v. Saad,31 the North Carolina Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether the doctor of a mental patient owed a duty to a third
person with regard to the acts of his patient. The plaintiff brought the
action to recover for personal injuries suffered as a result of the
wrongful release of her brother, who had a history of violence and
mental illness, by a staff psychiatrist at the hospital.32 Sixteen hours
after the patient was released, he stabbed the plaintiff twenty times
with a kitchen knife, inflicting "serious, disfiguring and life-threaten-
ing wounds."1
33
The Pangburn decision analyzed the legal duty involved in negligent
release cases:
25. Id. at 124.
26. Id.
27. 1& at 123-24.
28. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, supra note 3, § 319.
29. Semler, 538 F.2d at 125.
30. Id.
31. 73 N.C. App. 336, 326 S.E.2d 365 (1985).
32. Id. at 337, 326 S.E.2d at 366-67.
33. Id.
4
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[W]here the course of treatment of a mental patient involves an exer-
cise of "control" over [the patient] by a physician who knows or
should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others,
an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the
physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to pre-
vent harm to others at the hands of the patient.
34
Applying North Carolina tort principles, the Pangburn court found
that the "plaintiff states a claim for actionable negligence, namely,
that defendant breached a duty that he owed to plaintiff, and that she
was injured as proximate cause of that breach, it being reasonably
foreseeable that her injuries would result from the breach."35
Once the Pangburn court found a duty, it then wrestled with the
possible immunity provided by North Carolina General Statute § 122-
24, which provides that "[n]o administrator, chief of medical services,
or any staff member under the supervision and direction of the admin-
istrator or chief of medical services of any State hospital shall be per-
sonally liable for any act or thing done under or in pursuance of any of
the provisions of this Chapter."3 6 The plaintiff in Pangburn chal-
lenged the constitutionality of this statute by arguing that the statute
violated the equal protection clause 37 and the "open courts" provi-
sion 38 of the North Carolina Constitution. The court rejected both
constitutional challenges but construed the statute to grant a qualified
immunity, rather than an absolute immunity. The court concluded
that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-24 was "intended to create a qualified im-
munity for those state employees it protects, extending only to their
ordinary negligent acts. It does not, however, protect a tortfeasor
from personal liability for gross negligence and intentional torts. '3 9
Since the plaintiff alleged gross negligence, the court held that the "al-
legations were sufficient to state a claim for relief against defendant,
sufficient, at the pleadings level to overcome defendant's immunity.
'4°
Both parties had conceded that plaintiff had a remedy under the State
34. Id. at 338, 326 S.E.2d at 367 (quoting Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 287 S.E.2d 716, 721
(Ga. App. 1982)).
35. Pangburn 73 N.C. App. at 338-39, 326 S.E.2d at 367.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-24 (1981).
37. N.C. CON T. art. I, § 19, which states:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the
law of the land. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any
person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin.
38. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 18, which states: "All courts shall be open; every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of
law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay."
39. Pangburn, 73 N.C. App. at 347, 326 S.E.2d at 372.
40. Id. at 349, 326 S.E.2d at 373 (Wells, J., concurring).
19951
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Tort Claims Act4 ' which "permits a cause of action against the State
for injuries arising out of the negligent acts of a State employee, while
the employee was acting within the scope of employment.
42
A later decision by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina contradicts the Semler and Pangburn hold-
ings. In Cantrell v. United States,43 the court held that the voluntary
commitment of a patient (Puckett) to a Veterans Administration (VA)
hospital for mental treatment imposed no duty on the hospital to con-
trol the patient or to seek involuntary commitment. The court recog-
nized that "when a mentally ill person [has] been lawfully committed
to the institution and that institution has control and the power to
restrain a patient, negligent failure to exercise such authority over a
mentally ill patient could subject the institution to liability."" The
court went on to hold that although "Puckett had been voluntarily
committed at his request, insufficient control exists for the imposition
of a duty to control and consequently liability for negligence."4 In its
reasoning, the court focused on North Carolina General Statute
§ 122C-212(a) which states that "an individual who has been volunta-
rily admitted to a facility shall be discharged upon his own request."'
Such a facility has the discretion to hold patient for up to 72 hours
after the request for discharge is made.47 This enables the institution
to attempt to gain control over the patient by seeking involuntary
commitment. The court then reasoned that "[v]oluntary commitment
by Puckett would not have conferred control over him.., absent an
involuntary commitment proceeding. '4 8
The Cantrell court also briefly discussed whether the VA's medical
personnel had a duty to warn threatened third persons. The court
concluded that it does not "recognize such a duty by mental health
professionals to warn potential and identifiable victims of possible vio-
lence by mentally ill patients. '49 Even if such a duty existed, the court
opposed extending such a duty to warn unidentified third parties. The
court held that "[n]o duty would extend to Steven Cantrell because he
41. N.C. GEN. STAT., §§ 143-291 to 300.1 (1993).
42. Id. at 342, 326 S.E.2d at 369.
43. 735 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.N.C. 1988).
44. Id. at 673 (discussing the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Currie v. United States, 836 F.2d
209 (4th Cir. 1987)).
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN STAT. § 122C-212(a)).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-212(b) (1986).
48. Cantrell, 735 F. Supp. at 673; see also Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999, 1011-
12 (D. Md. 1982) (holding that the hospital had no duty to control a voluntary outpatient and
therefore no duty was imposed on the hospital to control him).
49. Cantrell, 735 F. Supp. at 674.
6
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was not identified by Puckett as a potential victim when consulting
with medical personnel."5
ANALYSIS
In King, no one disputed that the "defendants were aware of
Thompson's propensity for violence. A Willie M. certified class mem-
ber is by definition a violent person, and the defendants were charged
with the responsibility of providing treatment especially designed for
Willie M. children."'51 The crucial issue was "whether any of the de-
fendants had custody of Thompson or the ability or right to control
him."' 52 The King court held that the defendants could not be held
liable for the conduct of Thompson after his escape:
Materials in this record establish that the State of North Carolina is
obligated to provide appropriate services to every Willie M. certified
class member in this state. The participation by the class member is
voluntary, however, and, in absence of a court order, cannot be man-
dated. Thus, although defendants had an obligation to ensure the
safety of the community, may have had an obligation to report
Thompson's absence from Triangle House to the police and an obliga-
tion to seek his return, because there is no evidence of a court order
requiring participation in the Willie M. program, they had no legal
right to mandate his return to the facility. It cannot therefore be said
that any of the defendants had custody of Thompson or that they had
the ability or right to control him.
53
This rationale attempts to follow the Cantrell decision which imposed
no duty on a mental hospital to control a voluntarily committed pa-
tient. Both Cantrell and King involved mental patients with a history
of violence who were undergoing voluntary treatment. In both cases,
the court found that the treatment facilities had no duty to control the
patients' conduct and imposed no liability on the facilities for the vio-
lent acts committed by their patient against third persons.
In King, Thompson was residing at the Triangle House facility and
"was required to stay at the facility at all times in order to prevent his
continued abuse of drugs;"'54 thus, the Triangle House had physical
control over Thompson. In Cantrell, by contrast, the patient was liv-
ing at home and was only scheduled for individual outpatient consul-
tation.55 Since the facility in Cantrell did not exert any physical
control over the patient, its facts are distinguishable from King.
50. Id.
51. King, 113 N.C. App. 341, 346, 439 S.E.2d 771, 775.
52. Id.
53. Id. This passage expresses the court's sole rationale for its holding.
54. lit, 113 N.C. App. at 341, 439 S.E.2d at 772.
55. Cantrell, 735 F. Supp. at 672.
1995]
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In addition, it was conceded in King that "a Willie M. certified class
member is by definition a violent person. '5 6 The King court noted
that liability is justifiably imposed when the ability to control the per-
son, coupled with knowledge of the person's propensity for violence,
creates a special relationship.57 It is clear from the facts that Triangle
House had knowledge of Thompson's propensity for violence; this was.
not disputed by the defendants.58 The remaining issue was whether
the defendants had the "ability to control" Thompson. The King and
Cantrell courts blindly reasoned that there was no control or duty
without involuntary commitment proceedings or a court order.
Although Thompson was not required to enter the Willie M. pro-
gram, the opinion clearly states that "Thompson was required to stay
at the facility at all times .... ,,59 This statement implies that Triangle
House was authorized to exercise control over Thompson in order to
make sure he stayed at the facility. Further, the purpose of his treat-
ment was to cure his drug addiction by confining him to the facility. It
is difficult to understand the appellate court's conclusion that Triangle
House did not have the ability to control Thompson, especially since
Thompson left Triangle House through a door left unlocked in viola-
tion of the facility's rules.6° If the rules dictated that the doors be
locked, then Triangle House was required to maintain physical control
over the residents by keeping them at the facility. Again, King can be
distinguished from Cantrell since Thompson was supposed to be
locked inside the facility.
The Cantrell decision concluded that "even if [the patient] had been
voluntarily committed at his request, insufficient control exists for the
imposition of a duty to control and consequently liability for negli-
gence."'6 1 The court reasoned that since a voluntarily committed indi-
vidual could be discharged upon his own request, the facility did not
have any control of the patient.62 Further, the Cantrell court noted
that a facility has, by statute, "up to 72 hours after the request for
discharge is made ... to attempt to gain control which it does not have
over the patient by seeking involuntary commitment. ' 63 This analysis
completely ignores the control of the hospital prior to releasing the
patient. Indeed, the statute actually allows the facility to maintain
56. King, 113 N.C. App. at 346, 439 S.E.2d at 775.
57. Id. at 345-346, 439 S.E.2d at 774; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra
note 3, § 315.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 343, 439 S.E.2d at 773.
60. Id.
61. Cantrell, 735 F. Supp. at 673.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 673; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-212(b) (1986).
8
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control over a voluntary patient who wants to be released for up to an
additional three days.
In King, Thompson escaped through an unlocked door. He did not
make an official request for discharge. Thus, his escape circumvented
the statutory plan of allowing Triangle House to seek involuntary
commitment if the staff thought he was dangerous to the public.
Given the distinguishing facts indicating an "escape" from a secured
facility, the King court improperly relied on the Cantrell analysis. The
court admits that "the defendants had an obligation to ensure the
safety of the community, [and] may have had an obligation to report
Thompson's absence from Triangle House to the police and an obli-
gation to seek his return .... ", It does not seem consistent to say
that the defendants had an obligation to ensure the community's
safety, but to impose no duty on the defendants to fulfill that
obligation.
Finally, public policy dictates the imposition of liability in negligent
release cases, especially if the defendants were grossly negligent. In
order to be certified as a Willie M. class member, there must be evi-
dence of one of the following:
(a) physical attacks against other persons, with or without weapons;
(b) physical attacks against property, including burning;
(c) physical attacks against animals;
(d) self abusive or injurious behavior, including suicide attempts;
(e) threatened attack with a deadly weapon;
(f) forcible sexual attacks.65
The Willie M. certified class member is a social deviant with violent
propensities. To protect the community, the defendants should have
been legally responsible for keeping the Willie M. members locked up
during their stay at Triangle House. The institution's own rules re-
quired the doors to be locked. It is not unreasonable to impose liabil-
ity on the defendants for injuries that were reasonably foreseeable
when a Willie M. member escaped from the facility. To conclude
otherwise puts the community at risk of violence. If the court will not
impose a duty on the defendants in this situation, then the Willie M.
program should be abolished and the members should be locked up in
jail or some other facility that will ensure the community's safety.
The rate of violent crime in Durham increased 8.5 percent in 1994,
mirroring a national trend."'  Our society is currently clamoring for
stiffer punishment of criminals and greater protection of the general
64. King, 113 N.C. App. at 346-47, 439 S.E.2d at 775.
65. Id. at 344,439 S.E.2d at 774 (quoting a document entitled "Criteria for Certification as a
[Willie M.] Class Member" presented to the trial court at the hearing).
66. Kammie Michael, Reported Crime in Durham Drops 6 Percent, HERALD-SUN (Durham,
N.C.), Dec. 7, 1994, at Al. The article stated further:
1995]
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public from random violence. There is no more effective way to
achieve these goals than to provide an economic incentive for facilities
like Triangle House to carry out their functions with reasonable care.
Imposing a duty will provide that economic incentive.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court
of Appeals have unnecessarily put the general public in peril by not
imposing a duty on institutions to protect third persons from harm
when one of their patients escape, especially when the patients are
certified to have violent propensities, as did the Willie M. class mem-
bers in King. The court of appeals justified its decision by following
the Cantrell holding that only involuntary commitment or a court or-
der can impose such a duty. However, this analysis bypasses the legis-
lature's statutory plan utilizing involuntary commitment proceedings
to protect the general public. When a violent patient escapes from a
secured facility through a door left unlocked, the statutory protection
of involuntary commitment is lost. The North Carolina courts should
adopt the proposition, supported by the greater weight of authority in
other jurisdictions, that a duty arises out of the special relationship of
institution-patient when the patient escapes without formal discharge,
even if the treatment was voluntary.
TIMoTHY J. TURNER
Violent crime in Durham increased precipitously during the first two years of this decade
but then dropped more than 6 percent last year. Police officials blame the increased vio-
lence on the influx of crack cocaine to Durham and on an increased tendency toward vio-
lence among teens. "To me, the concern is youth violence. People realize that youthful
offenders [under 18] are more violent than they used to be," [Durham Police Lt. Col. Kent]
Fletcher said. The city's 6 percent drop in overall reported crime was fueled mainly by
sizable decreases in the number of reported burglaries and larcenies during the first half of
the year. "The thing that drives the crime rate is the number of larcenies and burglaries,"
Fletcher said.
Id. Note that in the King case, Thompson was a teenage drug addict.
10
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